美国国家标准与技术研究院《保护令牌与断言免遭伪造、窃取和滥用：面向联邦机构与云服务提供商的实施建议》（NIST IR 8587）

【说明】以下为NIST IR 8587《保护令牌与断言免遭伪造、窃取和滥用》（2026年9月）正文（原文，PDF 文字层完整提取）。 官方页面：https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8587/final 提取范围：全 55 页，此处提取前 24 页（正文主体：摘要、引言、威胁模型与架构考量、密钥与令牌管理建议）。如需引用，请以官方原文为准。 余下部分为附录与示例实现，请以官方 PDF 为准。 NIST Interagency Report NIST IR 8587 Protecting Tokens and Assertions from Forgery, Theft, and Misuse Implementation Recommendations for Agencies and Cloud Service Providers Ryan Galluzzo Andrew Regenscheid Stephanie Nelson Christine Lazcano This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8587 NIST Interagency Report NIST IR 8587 Protecting Tokens and Assertions from Forgery, Theft, and Misuse Implementation Recommendations for Agencies and Cloud Service Providers Ryan Galluzzo Applied Cybersecurity Division Information Technology Laboratory An drew Regenscheid Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory Stephanie Nelson Accenture Federal Supporting the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8587 September 2026 U.S. Department of Commerce Howard Lutnick, Secretary National Institute of Standards and Technology Arvind Raman, NIST Director and Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology Report written with: Christine Lazcano Cybersecurity Division Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency NIST IR 8587 Protecting Tokens and Assertions September 2026 Implementation Recommendations Certain equipment, instruments, software, or materials, commercial or non-commercial, are identified in this paper in order to specify the experimental procedure adequately. Such identification does not imply recommendation or endorsement of any product or service by NIST or CISA, nor does it imply that the materials or equipment identified are necessarily the best available for the purpose. There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by NIST in accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication, including concepts and methodologies, may be used by federal agencies even before the completion of such companion publications. Thus, until each publication is completed, current requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For planning and transition purposes, federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new publications by NIST. Organizations are encouraged to review all draft publications during public comment periods and provide feedback to NIST. Many NIST cybersecurity publications, other than the ones noted above, are available at https://csrc.nist.gov/publications. NIST Technical Series Policies Copyright, Use, and Licensing Statements NIST Technical Series Publication Identifier Syntax Publication History Approved by the NIST Editorial Review Board on 2026-08-27 How to Cite this NIST Technical Series Publication Galluzzo R, Regenscheid A, Nelson S, Lazcano C (2026) Protecting Tokens and Assertions from Forgery, Theft, and Misuse: Implementation Recommendations for Agencies and Cloud Service Providers. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Interagency Report (I R) NIST IR 8587. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8587 Author ORCID iDs Ryan Galluzzo: 0000-0003-0304-4239 Andrew Regenscheid: 0000-0002-3930-527X Contact Information iam@list.nist.gov National Institute of Standards and Technology Attn: Applied Cybersecurity Division, Information Technology Laboratory 100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 2000) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-2000 Additional Information Additional information about this publication is available at https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8587/final, including related content, potential updates, and document history. All comments are subject to release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). NIST IR 8587 Protecting Tokens and Assertions September 2026 Implementation Recommendations i Abstract T his report provides implementation guidelines to help federal agencies and cloud service providers (CSPs) protect identity tokens, access tokens, and assertions from forgery, theft, and misuse. Building on updates to NIST SP 800-53 (Release 5.1.1), it outlines principles for CSPs and consuming agencies, details architectural considerations for identity providers and authorization servers, and recommends enhancements to key management, token verification, and life cycle controls. The report addresses threats demonstrated in recent high-profile attacks, emphasizes the importance of secure by design practices, configurability, interoperability, and continuous monitoring, and provides specific technical recommendations to safeguard single sign-on (SSO), federation, and application programming interface (API) access scenarios. Ke ywords a ccess management; federation; key management; single sign-on; token management. Rep orts on Computer Systems Technology T he Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation’s measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL’s responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in federal information systems. NIST IR 8587 Protecting Tokens and Assertions September 2026 Implementation Recommendations ii Patent Disclosure Notice N OTICE: ITL has requested that holders of patent claims whose use may be required for compliance with the recommendations or requirements of this publication disclose such patent claims to ITL. However, holders of patents are not obligated to respond to ITL calls for patents and ITL has not undertaken a patent search in order to identify which, if any, patents may apply to this publication. As of the date of publication and following call(s) for the identification of patent claims whose use may be required for compliance with the recommendations or requirements of this publication, no such patent claims have been identified to ITL. No representation is made or implied by ITL that licenses are not required to avoid patent infringement in the use of this publication. NIST IR 8587 Protecting Tokens and Assertions September 2026 Implementation Recommendations iii Table of Contents 1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................1 1.1.1. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and AI Agents ....................................................................................... 2 2. Overview of Assertions and Tokens ................................................................................................7 2.3.1. Token Management Methods .................................................................................................... 10 2.3.2. Single Sign-On and Federation ................................................................................................... 11 2.3.3. API Access Scenarios................................................................................................................... 12 3. Document Structure & Approach .................................................................................................. 14 4. IA-13: Identity Providers and Authorization Servers ...................................................................... 15 4.1.1. Architecture and Design ............................................................................................................. 15 4.1.2. Risk Management and Risk Assessment .................................................................................... 18 4.1.3. Security Policy and Technical Documentation ........................................................................... 18 4.1.4. Authorization Systems and Zero Trust Architectures................................................................. 19 5. Control Enhancements ................................................................................................................. 20 5.1.1. Additional Guidelines for the Protection of Cryptographic Keys ............................................... 20 5.1.1.1. Generation ............................................................................................................................ 20 5.1.1.2. Distribution ........................................................................................................................... 21 5.1.1.3. Storage and Isolation for Keys and Cryptographic Functions ............................................... 22 5.1.1.4. Key Usage Periods and Rotation ........................................................................................... 24 5.1.1.5. Key Revocation and Destruction ........................................................................................... 25 5.2.1. Additional Guidelines for the Verification of Identity Assertions and Access Tokens ............... 26 5.2.1.1. Assertion and Token Contents .............................................................................................. 26 5.2.1.2. Key Scoping and Usage ......................................................................................................... 27 NIST IR 8587 Protecting Tokens and Assertions September 2026 Implementation Recommendations iv 5.3.1. Additional Guidelines for Token Management .......................................................................... 28 5.3.1.1. Token Refresh and Validity Length ....................................................................................... 29 5.3.1.2. Token Revocation ................................................................................................................. 30 5.3.1.3. Audience Restriction ............................................................................................................. 31 5.3.1.4. Session Monitoring and Analysis .......................................................................................... 31 5.3.1.5. Token Protection .................................................................................................................. 32 5.3.1.6. Workload Protections ........................................................................................................... 32 5.3.1.7. Logging .................................................................................................................................. 33 6. Threats and Attacks ...................................................................................................................... 34 7. Additional Considerations ............................................................................................................ 36 References ....................................................................................................................................... 40 Appendix A. List of Symbols, Abbreviations, and Acronyms ............................................................... 44 Appendix B. Glossary ....................................................................................................................... 46 List of Tables Table 1. Example responsibility areas .................................................................................................3 Table 2. Stateful and stateless architectures ..................................................................................... 11 Table 3: Document Structure ............................................................................................................ 14 Table 4. Design and architecture considerations ............................................................................... 16 Table 5. Risk mitigation capabilities .................................................................................................. 29 Table 6. Suggested log data elements ............................................................................................... 33 Table 7. Threats to tokens and assertions ......................................................................................... 34 List of Figures Fig. 1. Representative architecture: Token- and assertion-based systems .......................................... 10 NIST IR 8587 Protecting Tokens and Assertions September 2026 Implementation Recommendations v Acknowledgments T he authors wish to acknowledge the collaboration between NIST, CISA, and NSA to make this document possible. We would also like to acknowledge those subject-matter experts who participated in the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) Cloud Security Workshop in June of 2025 and provided invaluable insights that informed this document. NIST IR 8587 Protecting Tokens and Assertions September 2026 Implementation Recommendations 1 1. Introduction Recent cybersecurity incidents at major cloud service providers (CSPs) have resulted from the ability to steal, modify, or forge identity tokens and assertions used by enterprise single sign-on (SSO) and identity federation systems to gain access to sensitive applications, data, and communications. In response to this critical and emerging threat, NIST issued release 5.1.1 to Special Publication (SP) 800-53, Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations [1]. Released in November 2023,1 1 Release 5.2.0 to SP 800-53 was subsequently published in August 2025. the patch provided additional control and supporting control enhancements related to identity providers (IdPs), authorization servers, the protection of cryptographic keys, the verification of identity assertions and access tokens, and token management [2]. With the proliferation of cloud computing services and the distribution of government data and services to external infrastructure, platforms, and software, this threat becomes even more distinct. Agencies do not always have the visibility they need into the external services they procure to identify, respond to, and remediate emerging threats. As such, while this document provides controls and considerations that expand on SP 800-53, the recommendations contained herein are equally important to cloud services, whether commercially offered to agency customers or operated by government agencies. Federal agencies need to understand the architectures, designs, and deployment models of their CSPs to configure services that are consistent with their risk tolerance and threat environment. When providing services to federal agencies, CSPs need to deliver security mitigations that are configurable, transparent, and interoperable to empower cloud service consumers to implement risk-informed, threat-adaptive defenses across diverse environments. 1.1. Purpose and Scope This publication is scoped to federal environments and has been developed pursuant to the authorities detailed in 15 U.S.C. §278g–3. 2 2 15 U.S.C. §278g–3 directs NIST to develop standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements, for providing adequate information security for all agency operations, assets, and non-national security information systems used or operated by an agency, a contractor of an agency, or an organization on behalf of an agency. This document expands on the new control in SP 800-53 [1] and provides technical guidelines to support the implementation of token and assertion protections and cryptographic mechanisms. Specifically, this document covers controls that protect identity and access management (IAM) systems that rely on digitally signed assertions and tokens based on asymmetric cryptography when making access decisions. This often includes SSO, federation, application programming interface (API), and workload access scenarios. Systems that do not rely on asymmetric signed assertions and tokens (e.g., stateful management, schemes based on symmetric cryptography, API keys) are mentioned where relevant but out of scope for the controls covered. NIST IR 8587 Protecting Tokens and Assertions September 2026 Implementation Recommendations 2 1.1.1. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and AI Agents Artificial intelligence (AI) systems — especially agentic AI systems (AI agents) — use signed tokens or assertions in many emerging IAM schemes. Organizations should apply these guidelines when agents use signed tokens to access systems, data, tools, or APIs. This document is not a comprehensive guide to addressing AI and AI agent access risks. Those risks create additional IAM challenges that require further guidelines and, in some cases, new or expanded standards and protocols. This document excludes those topics from scope. NIST and CISA recognize this gap and continue to develop practical guidelines as AI and agentic AI systems gain traction. 3 3 More about NIST’s AI Agent Security Initiative and Associated projects can be found at https://www.nist.gov/caisi/ai-agent-standards- initiative. NIST has also announced as possible AI Agent Identity Project at the NCCoE, w hich can be found here: https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/software-a nd-ai-agent-identity-and-authorization. 1.2. Notations This document uses the following typographical conventions in text to indicate the parameters for entities that claim conformance. However, conformance with these guidelines remains voluntary for CSPs and federal agencies unless otherwise determined through policy, including OMB policies, or other binding agreements (e.g., contracts, grants). • Specific terms in CAPITALS represent normative requirements. When these same terms are not in CAPITALS, the term does not represent a normative requirement. o The terms “MUST” and “MUST NOT” indicate requirements to be followed to conform to these guidelines. o The terms “SHOULD” and “SHOULD NOT” indicate that a certain course of action is preferred but not necessarily required or that — in the negative form — a certain possibility or course of action is discouraged but not prohibited. Agencies may choose to include these requirements in whole or in part based on risk management needs. 1.3. Identity Management in Cloud and Hybrid Environments — Managing Responsibilities In cloud environments, security and identity management are governed by a shared responsibility model that must clarify which aspects of identity and credential hardening are managed by the CSP and which are the responsibility of the cloud consumer (i.e., organization or end user). Understanding and implementing this division is essential for maintaining robust security and preventing gaps that adversaries could exploit. CSP responsibilities often include securing the underlying infrastructure, maintaining core IAM services (e.g., authentication, federation, authorization), managing token issuance and signing, providing secure secrets storage, ensuring infrastructure-level logging and monitoring, and maintaining compliance with regulatory frameworks. CSPs provide the configurable security controls and tools necessary for consumers to build secure applications and services. NIST IR 8587 Protecting Tokens and Assertions September 2026 Implementation Recommendations 3 Cloud consumer responsibilities often include securely configuring IAM policies, managing application-level secrets and credentials, enforcing strong authentication and access controls, conducting operational security activities (e.g., deployment via DevSecOps pipelines, access reviews, red team exercises), and responding to incidents. Consumers are also responsible for educating their users and teams and for enabling logging in various services (when not on by default), configuring log duration and storage, and configuring alert and notification mechanisms based on logs. Consumer configuration choices are driven by risk assessments of the cloud-hosted services and the impacts of a loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. In nearly all cases and deployment scenarios, the CSP and the consumer will need to coordinate on logging, monitoring, incident response, and compliance reporting to ensure that incidents are managed effectively. It is important for CSPs and consuming agencies to understand their respective roles and responsibilities for managing IAM controls to support effective collaboration and comprehensive security in cloud environments. Coordination between CSPs and consuming agencies will largely be programmatic and/or automated, but some level of manual coordination will often be necessary. Table 1 provides an example of responsibility areas in a software-as-a-service (SaaS) environment. Table 1. Example responsibility areas Responsibility Area CSP Consumer Physical Security ● Infrastructure (Hardware/N etworking) ● Core IAM Services ● Token Issuance/Signing ● Secrets Vaults/Hardware Security Module ● Infrastructure Logging/Monitoring ● IAM Policy Configuration ● Application/User Access Control ● Application Secrets Management ● Multifactor Authentication (MFA)/User Authentication Setup ● Session Management ● Application Logging/Monitoring ● User Education ● ● Incident Response ● ● Continuous Monitoring ● ● Token Revocation ● ● NIST IR 8587 Protecting Tokens and Assertions September 2026 Implementation Recommendations 4 Actual responsibility boundaries vary by service model, contract terms, and technical capabilities exposed by the CSPs. Coordination is often implemented through documented interfaces, telemetry, and self-service controls, not solely through manual interactions. 1.4. Pri